In PODC 1991 Ostrovsky and Yung [35] introduced the proactive security model, where corruptions spread throughout the network, analogous to the spread of a virus or a worm. PODC 2006 distinguished lecture by Danny Dolev, that also appears in the PODC06 proceedings, lists the above work as one of PODC's "Century Papers at the First Quarter-Century Milestone" [22] . At the very center of this work is the notion of proactive secret sharing schemes. Secret sharing schemes allow a dealer to distribute a secret among a group of parties such that while the group of parties jointly possess the secret, no sufficiently small subset of the parties can learn any information about the secret. The secret can be reconstructed only when a sufficient number of shares are combined together. Most secret sharing schemes assume that an adversary can only corrupt some fixed number of the parties over the entire lifetime of the secret; such a model is unrealistic in the case where over a long enough period of time, an adversary can eventually corrupt all parties or a large enough fraction that exceeds such a threshold. More specifically, in the proactive security model, the adversary is not limited in the number of parties it can corrupt, but rather in the rate of corruption with respect to a "rebooting" rate. Ostrovsky and Yung proposed the first proactive secret sharing scheme, which received a lot of follow-up attention. In the same paper, Ostrovsky and Yung also showed that constructing a general purpose secure * The work of this author was performed while at HRL Laboratories. † The work of this author was performed while at HRL Laboratories.
INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing schemes allow a dealer to distribute shares of a secret among a set of parties such that a coalition of parties is needed in order to reconstruct the secret. The notion of secret sharing was introduced independently by Shamir [39] and Blakley [8] . Most secret sharing schemes provide threshold security, in which an adversary must corrupt more than a threshold number of parties over the lifetime of the secret in order to learn the secret. However, fixed bounds on adversary's corruption limit can be unrealistic for applications in which secrets are stored over long periods of time; indeed, a sophisticated adversary may be able to corrupt all parties given enough time.
Typically based on secret sharing schemes, secure multiparty computation (MPC) protocols allow a set of distrusting parties P1, ..., Pn, with private inputs x1, ..., xn, to jointly compute a function f while guaranteeing correctness of its evaluation and privacy of inputs for honest parties. The study of secure computation was initiated by [42] for two parties and [29] for many parties. The information-theoretic setting was introduced by [4] and [18] , where assuming private channels MPC protocols were shown to tolerate less than 1/3 of malicious parties. Assuming a broadcast channel, [36] shows how protocols can tolerate less than 1/2 of malicious parties. Fixed bounds on adversary's corruption limit are unrealistic for protocols that have very long execution times, especially when considering so-called "reactive" functionalities that never stop executing, e.g., continuously running control loops. Constructing MPC protocols that guarantee security against stronger adversary models and at the same time satisfy low communication and computational complexity bounds has been an important program in cryptography, and has seen significant progress, e.g., [31, 20, 19, 5] .
One approach to modeling security in secret sharing and secure computation settings where an adversary is able to eventually corrupt all parties is the so-called proactive security model [35] , which introduces the notion of a mobile adversary. A mobile adversary is one that can corrupt all parties in a distributed protocol during the execution but with the following limitations: (1) a fixed number of parties can be corrupted during any round; (2) parties periodically get rebooted to a clean initial state, where all previous state information is also erased 1 . The idea of such rebooting is to guarantee that only a small fraction of parties will be corrupted at any one time, though this guarantee depends on the rates of corruption and rebooting. We remark that we model rebooting to a clean initial state including global computation information (e.g., the circuit to be computed, the identities of the other parties in the computation, access to perfectly secure point-to-point channels and to a broadcast channel).
This paper consider two questions: (1) can we construct efficient, proactive, UC-secure secret sharing schemes and MPC protocols, and (2) how much can we improve the communication complexity of previous proactive protocols, both for secret sharing and MPC? The paper answers the former question positively by designing such a proactive, UC-secure secret sharing scheme and using it to construct a proactive, UC-secure MPC protocol. In addressing the latter question, we show that the constructed proactive secret sharing scheme has constant amortized communication thus improving significantly (by a factor of n 2 ) on all previously know proactive secret sharing schemes (see Table 1 for a comparison). The constructed proactive MPC protocol matches the asymptotic communication complexity of the best known MPC results in the "classical" model of stationary faults [19] .
Related Work
Ostrovsky and Yung introduced the proactive security model in [35] . The same paper also contains the first proactive secret sharing (PSS) scheme and proactive MPC (PMPC) protocol.
The central tool introduced in [35] is Proactive Secret sharing (PSS) and there has been significant follow up work on PSS schemes, both in the synchronous and asynchronous network models (see Table 1 for a comparison). The most efficient PSS scheme is [30] , which has O(n 2 ) communication complexity per secret share. By contrast, our work has O(1) (amortized) communication complexity per secret share. Further, we are not aware of any previous UC-secure PSS scheme. We note that our work is in the synchronous model; extending our work to the asynchronous model is an interesting open problem.
In addition to proactive secret sharing, proactive security has played a fundamental role in several areas, including proactively secure threshold encryption and signature schemes [23, 24, 37, 14, 25, 9, 34, 33] (and in particular [1] , which also sketches a definition of UC security in the proactive framework), intrusion-resilient signatures [32] , eavesdropping games [26] , pseudorandomness [15] , and statemachine replication [16, 17] .
The only known general PMPC protocol is due to [35] . The protocol is proven secure in the stand-alone corruption model and requires at least O(Cn 3 ) communication complexity. By contrast, the PMPC protocol in this paper is UC-secure and has near-linear communication complexity.
Main Ideas Behind Our Protocols
We construct the first UC-secure proactive secret sharing scheme and MPC protocol with near-linear communication complexity using the following new ideas.
Packed Proactive Secret Sharing (PPSS).
We construct the UC-secure packed proactive secret sharing (PPSS) scheme by extending techniques presented in [19, 27] to the proactive security model. The new scheme allows one to share many secrets with constant (amortized) communication complexity per secret. In order to renew, i.e., rerandomize, sharings of secrets, the parties generate random masking polynomials. To renew a polynomial f that stores a block of secrets via the evaluation points (f (β 1 ), . . . , f (β ℓ )), parties generate a random polynomial R which evaluates to zero at β 1 , . . . , β ℓ and set the renewed polynomial to be f +R. In contrast to previous schemes (such as [30] and [38] ), our scheme amortizes random polynomial generation by using hyper-invertible matrices to more efficiently construct batches of random polynomials.
Paper Network Security
Threshold Communication Complexity [41] synch. cryptographic t/n < 1/2 exp(n) [43] asynch. cryptographic t/n < 1/3 exp(n) [11] asynch. cryptographic The process of reconstructing new shares for rebooted parties, who no longer hold secret shares, is a major communication bottleneck in previous work [38, 30] . Our new reconstruction protocol combines, for the first time, double sharing with packed sharing to achieve O(1) per-secret amortized communication complexity, improving upon previous protocols by a factor of n 2 . In order to use these double sharings, it is necessary to verify that the players shared their shares correctly. This is accomplished using hyper-invertible matrices in a novel way, which we now sketch. Previous protocols [3, 20] have used hyper-invertible matrices for error correction by multiplying a vector of data structures by a hyper-invertible matrix and having each party check one entry/data structure in the resultant vector for errors. In [20] , the data structures are packed sharings; in [3] , the data structures are pairs of Shamir-sharings that share the same value. In our protocol, each data structure is a collection of sharings and corresponding double sharings 2 . After multiplication by a hyper-invertible matrix, each player checks one entry in the resultant vector to make sure that the double sharings contain the correct shares. By using hyper-invertible matrices with these larger data structures, a technique introduced for the first time in this paper, we are able to check the correctness of the double sharings without asymptotically increasing the communication complexity of the protocol.
Proactive MPC (PMPC) Techniques. The main approach for our PMPC protocol is to compute the circuit layer by layer, while proactively redistributing the parties' secret shares after each layer. Therefore, if each layer is computed using subprotocols that are secure in the non-proactive setting up to a threshold t, and our PPSS share redistribution protocol is also secure up to threshold t, then the overall PMPC protocol is proactively secure up to a threshold t between proactive refreshes. The approach to construct our PMPC protocol is realized as follows:
During initialization of the protocol, the circuit is transformed as in [19] so that each layer contains either only addition gates or only multiplication gates; each gate has two inputs, multiplication gates have one output, and addition gates have either one or two outputs. This transformation is necessary in order to do arithmetic with block-shared secrets, and it does not asymptotically increase the size of the circuit (measured as the number of gates plus the number of wires).
Each party then shares their inputs using the PPSS scheme. The circuit is then evaluated layer by layer. Before each layer, the secrets are permuted so that they are in the correct order for performing the arithmetic operations for that layer. For an addition layer, the gates are computed by locally adding shares. For a multiplication layer, the gates are computed using a standard technique.
After each circuit layer and after each permutation, the parties execute the new redistribution protocol 3 . This rerandomizes the sharings of the secrets so that old shares are erased and leak no information about current sharings to an adversary that obtained them. Redistribution also allows parties that have been rebooted to recover the required shares to continue the computation. This is where our new PPSS scheme is critically utilized.
Once all the layers of the circuit have been evaluated, the parties reconstruct the shares to obtain their outputs.
The initial PMPC protocol that is constructed has a corruption rate threshold less than (1/3 − ϵ)n and subsequently uses Bracha committees [10] to obtain a protocol with the desired threshold, with each committee simulating one player. However, one must overcome an additional difficulty because using Bracha committees might violate the need to have a constant number of rounds between share redistributions. More specifically, we construct a new multiparty protocol that is executed within each committee, allowing the committee to perform the Berlekamp-Welch algorithm in a constant number of communication rounds (whereas performing the Berlekamp-Welch algorithm in a "straightforward" manner would lead to Ω(n) communication rounds).
We remark that our techniques can be used to also construct a proactive, statistically UC-secure MPC protocol with similar communication and computational complexity that tolerates up to (1/2 − ϵ)n corruptions between refreshments. See the full version [2] for further discussion.
Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is the construction of the first UC-secure packed proactive secret sharing (PPSS) scheme. The PPSS scheme has an amortized communication complexity of O(1) per shared secret and is perfectly UC-secure in the synchronous model with secure point-topoint channels and authenticated, reliable broadcast against a malicious adversary that can corrupt up to (1/3 − ϵ)n parties per fixed period of time for any constant ϵ > 0. The PPSS protocol can also be modified to be statistically UC-secure and tolerate up to (1/2 − ϵ)n corruptions between refreshments.
A second contribution of this paper is a new proactive MPC (PMPC) protocol with communication complexity on par with the most efficient non-proactive MPC protocol in the literature today [19] . The constructed PMPC protocol greatly improves on the communication complexity of the only other known PMPC protocol in [35] .
Our PMPC protocol has communication and computational complexity
where C is the number of gates plus the number of wires in the circuit, D is the depth of the circuit, and n is the number of parties (see Section 4.3 for an explanation of the PMPC protocol complexity). Our protocol is perfectly UCsecure in the synchronous network model against a malicious adversary that can corrupt up to (1/3 − ϵ)n parties between refreshments for any constant ϵ > 0. The most efficient nonproactive MPC protocol under the same assumptions ( [19] ) has communication and computational complexity
Our PMPC protocol can also be modified to be statistically UC-secure and tolerate up to (1/2 − ϵ)n corruptions between refreshments with similar communication and computational complexity as in the perfectly secure case.
DEFINITIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
This section outlines the main techniques required for constructing the proactive secret sharing scheme and MPC protocol. It also contains a brief discussion of the proactive security model under the UC framework (for further details, see the full version [2] ).
The Proactive Model under the UC Framework
Security of the proactively-secure protocols in this paper is proven in the Universal Composability (UC) framework introduced in [12] and revised in [13] . Specifically, the proactive UC model considered in this paper considers parties that can perform erasures; in the proactive model, parties must be able to erase their states so that when they are compromised, an adversary only learns their current state and not all their previous ones. Parties communicate synchronously and have access to secure point-to-point channels and a broadcast channel; how this would be implemented is beyond the scope of this paper. 4 Similar to the definition of proactive UC security in [1] , the execution of a proactive protocol, π, proceeds in communication rounds, denoted by r i,l , and the initial round is round r0,0. A phase, denoted ph consists of a number of consecutive rounds r i,l , ..., r i+j,l , and every round r j,l belongs to exactly one phase ph l . Each phase of π is either a refreshment or an operation phase. The phases of π alternate between refreshment and operation phases. Each refreshment phase ph l consists of rounds r i,l , ..., r i+j,l , such that there exists a k, 0 ≤ k < j where rounds r i,l , ..., r i+k,l are denoted the closing period of refreshment phase ph l while r i+k+1,l , ..., r i+j,l denote the opening period of refreshment phase ph l . Finally, a stage st (starting at stage 0) consists of an opening refreshment period, an operation phase and then a closing refreshment period, therefore including a full (operation) phase and two sequences of two refreshment stages; each refreshment is the closing of one stage and the opening of the other. An adversary in the proactive model is limited to corrupting a certain threshold of parties per stage. At the end of each stage (i.e., at the refreshment phase) corrupted parties are rebooted to a pristine state and sent the shares to continue the computation. We note that, as in [1] , a party corrupted during the refreshment phase is considered to be corrupted in both stages associated with that phase. We refer the reader to Section 1 for a discussion of rebooting and to the full version [2] for a discussion of an oblivious resetting strategy. The full version contains the exact details of the the proactive UC model as well as definitions of security.
Preliminaries
Packed Secret Sharing. Our proactive secret sharing scheme relies on a generalization of Shamir's polynomialbased secret sharing scheme [39] . In particular, we start with a variant of the packed secret sharing scheme due to [27] which was utilized in an MPC protocol by [20, 19] . The scheme works as follows: for n parties and d ∈ N, fix a finite field F = Zq for q > 2n as well as a genera- 
, where addition and multiplication here are element-wise. We refer the reader to [20, 19] for further details.
We use two different thresholds and batch sizes in the construction of our protocols. For constructing the perfectly secure PPSS scheme, we use a threshold of t < (1/3 − ϵ)n and a batch size of ℓ = n − 3t. For constructing the statistically secure PPSS scheme and for constructing the PMPC protocol (either perfect or statistical), we will require that ℓ is the highest power of 2 not greater than n/4, that the maximal corruption rate 5 is t < n/8 and that d = t+ℓ−1. We will rely on the constant-round protocol RobustShare in [20] to implement this sharing; it is perfectly UC-secure with the above parameters. We stress, however, that the techniques above have never been adopted to the proactive setting before; in particular, one of the main contributions of this paper is to perform a new proactive packed secret share redistribution with low amortized overhead.
When a party is accused of being corrupt during secret sharing or redistribution, the parties make a worst-case assumption that both the accuser and the accused are corrupt.
Thus both are added to the set Corr, which is initialized to be empty. Note that security is maintained because the initial threshold of corruption is either t < (1/3 − ϵ)n or t < n/8. In the case that the threshold is t < n/8, the threshold is later raised to t < (1/3 − ϵ)n with perfect security (t < (1/2 − ϵ)n with statistical security) using party virtualization [10] ; see the full version [2] for further details. For the perfectly secure PPSS scheme, the initial threshold of t < (1/3 − ϵ)n is never raised, and hence we do not use player virtualization. It is only in the PMPC protocol and the statistically secure PPSS scheme that player virtualization is employed. In the proactive model, the set of corrupt parties may change over time, so in addition to initializing Corr = ∅ at the beginning of the PPSS protocol, Corr is also reset to ∅ after each redistribution.
Hyper-Invertible Matrices. Many of the subprotocols that we use require a publicly agreed upon hyper-invertible matrix [3] . A hyper-invertible matrix is a matrix where any square sub-matrix formed by removing rows and columns is invertible. It is shown in [3] (In other words, M interpolates the points θ1, . . . , θa on a polynomial given the points ϕ1, . . . , ϕ b on that polynomial.) Many of the sub-protocols assume the existence of a publicly known hyper-invertible matrix, and these may be efficiently constructed during pre-processing.
Polynomial Interpolation. One algorithm relied upon for our proactive share redistribution protocol is the classic Berlekamp-Welch algorithm [7] . If a party is given points on a polynomial (such as shares of a block of secrets) and some of the points have been corrupted (such as when corrupted parties alter their shares), the Berlekamp-Welch algorithm allows correct interpolation of the polynomial despite the corrupted points.
Required Subprotocols To perform basic operations such as secret sharing, generating random sharings, and multiplying shared secrets, we use three protocols from [20] (RobustShare, RanDouSha, and Reco) and three from [19] (RandomPairs, PermuteWithinBlocks, and Multiply). We refer the reader to those works for protocol specifications and corresponding ideal functionalities. Each of these protocols is constant-round and is proven secure in their respective papers, though in the standard, non-proactive model with a corruption threshold of at least n/8. The sharings used in these protocols are all block sharings.
• RobustShare(d):
6 Allows a set of parties to verifiably share Θ(n) secrets in blocks with polynomials of degree d. 6 For the case in which the initial threshold is t < (1/3 − ϵ)n, we require a modification of RobustShare in which the set H in that protocol has size n − 2t instead of n − 3t as stated in [20] . The authors state in footnote b of RobustShare that up to 2t players can be eliminated due to disputes and up to t may be corrupt, so that there are at least n−3t honest, uneliminated players. However, it is clear that for every honest eliminated player, there is a corrupt eliminated player, so we are actually guaranteed at least n − 2t honest, un-eliminated players.
• • RandomPairs(L,π,d): For a permutation π, this protocol generates L pairs of random block-sharings
• 
DETAILS OF THE PACKED PROACTIVE SECRET SHARING (PPSS) SCHEME
In this section we construct our efficient PPSS scheme. We do so using the packed secret sharing subprotocol RobustShare, which shares packed secrets in the non-proactive model [20, 19] . We construct a new subprotocol BlockRedistribute, that only requires constant amortized communication, to perform proactive secret redistribution to complete the PPSS scheme.
Proactive Share Redistribution
The share redistribution protocol Block-Redistribute forms the core of our PPSS scheme, and forms the redistribution phase of PMPC. It is constructed to redistribute shares for W secrets shared among the parties P (some of whom may be recently rebooted and do not actually have any shares). The subprotocol consists of three consecutive phases. First, the parties rerandomize their shares so that secret shares in the next proactive stage are independently distributed from previous stages. The parties then perform verifiable double sharing in order to correctly and privately distribute party share information to all parties without actually revealing the shares. Finally, the parties perform share reconstruction to restore the current state of the computation to newly rebooted parties who do not have shares to continue the computation. We will give an overview of each phase in Section 3.1.1 and then specify Block-Redistribute in Section 3.1.2. The ideal functionality FBR that the protocol is designed to emulate and the security proof for Block-Redistribute are given in the full version [2] .
Outline of Block-Redistribute
We refer the reader to Section 2 for the notation used in this section. For simplicity, we assume that the number of secrets, W , to be used as input for Block-Redistribute is a multiple of ℓ 2 (n − 3t) (e.g., W = Bℓ 2 (n − 3t) for some B), where secrets are shared 7 in blocks of size ℓ. We can then 7 If W is not a multiple of ℓ 2 (n−3t), we can generate random sharings of blocks to make it so; using RanDouSha, this can arrange the polynomials H corresponding to these shares as
We think of B as the number of groupings of secret shares, and operations will be performed on each group in parallel throughout the protocol. We first provide some intuition for this arrangement of polynomials as well as for the parameters a, k, and m, before further outlining Block-Redistribute. We will require a particular structure of secrets in order to perform share reconstruction in an efficient fashion. The idea is that we want to be able to allow rebooted parties to reconstruct their shares in such a way that corrupt parties cannot learn any information about honest parties' shares. We accomplish this by having parties distribute shares of their shares. The parameter a is bounded by ℓ because every ℓ shares (each corresponding to ℓ secrets) will form the basis for a single polynomial for the double sharing. One can perform computations on these double sharings using Lagrange coefficients to perform share reconstruction for the rebooted parties.
In order to verify that these double sharings are correct, the parties arrange their shares and double shares in B vectors of length n − 3t, with an additional t elements chosen at random to further mask the inputs; this is why k is bounded by n − 3t. A hyper-invertible matrix M will be applied to each of these B vectors to obtain B vectors of length n, corresponding to the n parties. Each party Pi will check the double sharings by each checking the i th entry of the B output vectors; in this fashion, we completely distribute double sharing verification. Because M is hyper-invertible, the outputs that each party checks will be immune from corrupt parties trying to skew the verification. We now explain the three phases of Block-Redistribute in more detail.
Share Rerandomization. This component comprises the closing period of the redistribution phase (see Section 2.1). We mask the shares by constructing ℓ(n − 3t)B polynomials Q . By the additive property of our secret sharing scheme, the new shares correspond to the same secrets but are now distributed uniformly at random from all past shares.
Verifiable Double Sharing. This component together with Share Reconstruction below comprises the opening period of the redistribution phase. Let M be a (publicly agreed upon) hyper-invertible matrix with n rows and n− 2t columns. As was noted in [21] , if y = M x, then we can also use Berlekamp-Welch to "interpolate" x from y if no more than t coordinates of y are in error (via adversarial corruption in this context).
The first step is to construct random padding in the form of additional polynomials { H and U (i, k,m) .
(α i ); if not, P k broadcasts an accusation of Pi and both parties are viewed as corrupted. While this strategy lowers the corruption threshold from n/4 to n/8, it is an efficient way to handle dispute resolution, and increasing the threshold later can be accomplished using Bracha committees (see [19] and the full version of this paper [2] ).
Share Reconstruction. Now that each party has verified double shares of all the other parties' shares, share reconstruction for a newly rebooted 8 party Pj can be accomplished by applying the appropriate Lagrange coefficients λj,i to the double sharings U (i,k,m) and then having Pj apply Berlekamp-Welch to interpolate her own share. This is because, for indices z1, ..., zn−2t of parties with correct double shares, λj,1U
Specification of Block-Redistribute
Our protocol requires a slightly altered version of RanDouSha for the first step. In [20] , RanDouSha calls on a subprotocol SemiRobustShare, and in that protocol, step 2(a) (see page 6 in [20] ) is altered so that the parties check that the polynomials evaluate to zero at β j for j = 1, . . . , ℓ, and an accusation is broadcast if they do not. Security for this slightly modified protocol easily follows.
Block-Redistribute
We assume that the secrets have been stored in blocks of size ℓ (as described in Section 2) using polynomials
8 Asymptotically, there is no cost to executing share redistribution for all, rather than rebooted, parties. . . . , n − 2t, and m = 1, . . . , B and shares them via RobustShare.
The parties locally compute H
(k,m) a ← H (k,m) a + Q (k,m) a .for 1 ≤ a ≤ ℓ, 1 ≤ m ≤ B and k = n − 3t + 1, . . . , n − 2t. 2.2 Each Pi selects polynomials U (i,1,m) , . . . , U (i,(n−2t),m) of degree ≤ d such that U (i,k,m) (β a ) = H (k,m) a (α i ) for a = 1, . . . , ℓ, k = 1,
Define H
) T Each party in P locally computes their shares of these polynomials.
Each party in P sends all their shares of H ( k,m) a
and U (i, k,m) to party P k for each a, i, and m.
2.5
Each P k uses Berlekamp-Welch on the shares [2] ) in the synchronous, adaptive corruption model with corruption threshold t < (1/3 − ϵ)n.
Each
We note that this theorem is in the standard, rather than proactive, security model. For the proof of Theorem 1, see the full version [2] .
DETAILS OF THE PROACTIVE MPC (PMPC) PROTOCOL
This section describes the details of our efficient proactively secure MPC protocol. We first give a more detailed overview of the protocol construction and the techniques and subprotocols required. Next, we discuss the circuit transformations that are required to perform required operations on packed secret shares (further details are given in the full version [2] ). Finally, we construct the full protocol secure with per-stage corruption threshold n/8. In order to obtain a corruption threshold of (1/3 − ϵ)n for perfect security or (1/2−ϵ)n for statistical security, we use a Bracha committee construction; due to lack of space, we discuss the construction in the full version [2] .
PMPC Protocol Overview
We first provide an overview of how we construct the PMPC protocol. As discussed in Section 2.2, we rely upon several subprotocols already in the MPC literature.
We stress that each of the subprotocols that we use, including Block-Redistribute, are proven secure individually in the non-proactive security model. However, by composing them properly, namely by applying Block-Redistribute after each layer of the computation, we obtain proactive security. This is because by construction at each stage, the number of corrupted parties is at most the stage corruption threshold; executing Block-Redistribute ensures that corruptions in one stage cannot be carried over to break security of another future stage.
During initialization of the PMPC protocol, the circuit is transformed so that all addition and multiplication gates have only two inputs and either one or two outputs and are arranged in such a way that each layer consists of only addition gates or multiplication gates. This increases the circuit size (measured as the number of wires) by a constant factor, and increases circuit depth by a log C multiplicative factor.
In the first step of the PMPC protocol, parties share their inputs using RobustShare. Over the course of the protocol, whenever random shares are needed, either by RanDouSha or RandomPairs, they are generated within a constant number of circuit layers from use; this "dynamic" preprocessing is so that Block-Redistribute does not have to be executed unnecessarily to maintain these shares, thereby increasing the asymptotic communication complexity.
Before each layer of the circuit is computed, the secrets are permuted (or re-arranged) to facilitate the process of computation. This is because the secrets are shared in blocks and they must be rearranged to compute on them per circuit specification. This rearrangement is performed by decomposing the required permutation into sub-permutations and then performing each of the sub-permutations in succession; this adds another log C multiplicative factor to the communication complexity. See Section 4.2 for details.
After the permutation has been executed, addition gates are evaluated via locally adding shares, while multiplication gates are evaluated by creating pairs of random sharings using RanDouSha (through dynamic preprocessing) and then executing Multiply.
After each layer of the circuit is evaluated, where we now include each sub-permutation execution to constitute a layer, the parties run Block-Redistribute to re-randomize all stored secrets, thereby preserving proactive privacy of all stored values.
Once a sharing for an output gate has been computed, the parties invoke Reco to reveal it to the intended recipient. Once all the outputs have been revealed, the protocol is complete.
Circuit Transformation and Share Permutation
Since the circuit computes on individual values but secrets are shared in blocks, care must be taken to actually implement the circuit on secret-shared blocks of data because addition and multiplication of blocks occurs element-wise according to position within the blocks, which therefore must be rearranged to perform arbitrary addition and multiplication of the shares per the circuit instructions. To remedy this, we first transform the circuit itself in the same manner as [19] . Again, this increases the circuit size by a constant factor, and increases circuit depth by a log C multiplicative factor. Then, at each layer of computation of the circuit we will perform a permutation on all the secrets to make sure that the secrets are arranged in the correct order for whatever arithmetic operations that layer requires.
In order to perform the permutations, we use Beneš networks [6] , also known as Waksman networks [40] . These networks were used in the context of multiparty computation in [19] , and also in the context of fully homomorphic encryption in [28] . Let the layer of the circuit have width w, where each gate has fan-in 2. The main idea is that an arbitrary permutation on the O(w/ℓ) blocks of secrets needed to compute the layer can be performed using O(log(w)) constantround subprotocols that execute the decomposition of the permutation into O(log(w)) sub-permutations. We denote this protocol PermuteLayer, which has as inputs the permutation π as well as all the secret shares of each of the parties. We defer the construction of PermuteLayer to the the full version [2] due to lack of space. Figure 1 outlines the protocol that uses all the subprotocols described above to securely compute the circuit. We note that step 4.1 below is abbreviated; in the full implementation, we invoke RanDouSha to pad to a multiple of ℓ 2 (n − 3t) sharings.
The Full PMPC Protocol

PMPC:
1. To analyze the communication complexity 10 of PMPC, note that the communication complexity of performing multiplications on a layer, performing additions on a layer, permuting a layer, and redistributing a layer are all the same, namely O(W + poly(n)) if the circuit width is W . In the worst case, W = C, so it is O(C + poly(n)). The number of layers is initially D, the depth of the circuit. After the circuit is transformed so that no gate has fan-in or fan-out more than 2, the depth is D log(C). Furthermore, if there are C secrets to permute at each layer, than this would take log(C) permutations. So if we think of the operation of permutation as a layer in the circuit, the final depth of the circuit would be D log 2 (C). Thus the communication complexity is O((C + poly(n)) · D log 2 (C)), or O(DC log 2 (C) + Dpoly(n) log 2 (C)). The same reasoning shows that the computational complexity is O(DC log 2 (C)polylog(n) + Dpoly(n) log 2 (C)). For circuits that are "layered" in such a way that each output from a gate is used in the next layer and no other layers, we no longer assume that W = C; instead, we denote the widths of layers 1 through [Wi + poly(n)] = O(C log 2 C + Dpoly(n) log 2 C) with a computational complexity of O(C log 2 Cpolylog(n) + Dpoly(n) log 2 C). In terms of broadcast complexity, our protocol uses O(1) broadcasts per dispute. Since the number of disputes that can arise between secret redistributions is at most t, the total number of broadcasts is O(Dn).
Theorem 2. For n parties and an arithmetic circuit C that is at least Ω(n) gates wide, the protocol PMPC realizes proactive multiparty computation (corresponding ideal functionality FC in [2] ) with perfect security in the proactive UC model against an active and adaptive adversary corrupting up to t < n/8 parties per stage.
Using the party virtualization techniques of [10] (see [19] and the full version of this paper [2] ), we can increase the corruption threshold as to t < (1/3−ϵ)n. We denote PMPCpv as the protocol that executes PMPC using player virtualization. The communication complexity of PMPC-pv is O(C log 2 Cpolylogn + Dpoly(n) log 2 C), which is sum of the communication complexity and the computation complexity of PMPC. However, the communication complexity of Block-Redistribute is not affected by player virtualization.
Theorem 3. For any 0 < δ < 1/3, for n parties and an arithmetic circuit C that is at least Ω(n) gates wide, the protocol PMPC-pv realizes proactive multiparty computation (corresponding ideal functionality FC in [2] ) with perfect security in the proactive UC model against an active and adaptive adversary corrupting up to t < δn parties per stage.
Theorem 3 can also be extended so that, with statistical security, 0 < δ < 1/2; see the full version [2] for further details.
